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From Exemptions to Censorship: Religious Liberty and Victimhood in Obergefell v.
Hodges.
This article analyzes the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, showing that a
subset of the dissent constructed devout religious groups as victims to re-articulate power
relations between the state, LGBT groups, and religious entities. This re-articulation is
possible as a consequence of ambiguity in the legal concept religious liberty, which is
explored in depth. That ambiguity is employed to mount an argument against the
decision, moving LGBT individuals from oppressed to oppressor of religious groups. The
study contextualizes this inversion against the material and symbolic conditions of both
the LGBT, and devout Christian, communities in the United States.
Keywords: Obergefell v. Hodges, religious liberty, victimhood, legal rhetoric, dissent

2
From Exemptions to Censorship: Religious Liberty and Victimhood in Obergefell v.
Hodges.
On June 26, 2015, advocates for marriage equality were jubilant as the Supreme Court of
the United States issued a 5-4 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Obergefell, a landmark case
concerning the constitutional right to marriage for same-sex couples, was a triumph in the
protracted struggle for LGBT rights in the United States. President Barack Obama remarked
following the decision’s announcement that “progress on this journey often comes in small
increments, (…). And then sometimes, there are days like this when that slow, steady effort is
rewarded with justice that arrives like a thunderbolt.”1 Though LGBT activists still faced
considerable opposition, only 57% of the public supporting marriage equality in May of 2015,2
supporters viewed Obergefell as a crucial victory in the public battle for dignity.
Notably, a conflict surfaced post-Obergefell that focused on the influence the decision
would have on the exercise of religious liberty in the United States. Indeed, religious liberty
claims are now at the center of legal backlash against LGBT gains. Lisa Corrigan suggests
religious liberty claims have been simmering under the legal surface for some time, isolating
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby as a moment where the legal and social culture concerning LGBT rights
was forced to grapple with implications for religious liberty in the context of closely held
Christian corporations. 3 In light of Burwell, much of the subsequent public backlash to LGBT
rights has focused on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and state level iterations
of religious freedom bills. To wit, cursory glances at headlines following Obergefell suggest that
some religious figures believed the decision to be uniquely detrimental to people of faith.4
These lamentations are not swan songs, the resignations of hegemonic forces moving to
the periphery. Rather, the articulation of religious believers as victims is a component of a
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rhetorical strategy to capitalize on the paradoxical power of victimhood. In the search for
restorative justice, power imbalances can manifest wherein being the victim of oppression
becomes desirable because of the rhetorical power that position affords. By privileging the
discourse of victims in response to oppression, a space has been created wherein victimhood
discourse has been co-opted to reify oppressive structures. Justin Crumbaugh notes one reaction
to giving platforms to marginalized voices has been to dispute the right to call oneself a victim.5
Dominant groups vie to simultaneous discredit the suffering of the marginalized while elevating
themselves in a strategy Crumbaugh calls the “ontology” of victimhood.”6 Pascal Bruckner, a
cynical critic of this ontology, suggests in The Tyranny of Guilt “the victim madness has done so
much damage that for some people the concentration camp uniform has become the garment of
light.”7 As counter-hegemonic voices have foregrounded the testimony of those who have
suffered, forces have responded by co-opting the rhetoric of victims to downplay harm.
The prevalence of religious liberty claims, and subsequently claims of victimhood,
following Burwell comes to a head in Obergefell v. Hodges. Obergefell represents the
culmination of years of LGBT activism, with a prior decision in United States v. Windsor laying
the legal and rhetorical groundwork for the overturn of bans on marriage equality. Viewing
Obergefell as the wholesale rejection of victim claims to religious liberty in the context of LGBT
rights should give scholars pause, however. In light of a rhetorical culture where religious liberty
is both salient and amorphous, the possibility of reconstitution exists. As such, of specific
interest is the way the dissenting opinions use religious liberty to refute the majority. Erin Rand
suggests judicial dissents can be transformative, functioning simultaneously to legitimate the
existence of the Supreme Court while (re)contextualizing and casting doubt on the majority
decision.8 Dissents have a co-constitutive relationship with public culture, drawing from and
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subsequently shaping the rhetorical boundaries of salient concepts. In Obergefell, an opportunity
existed for the dissenting Justices to reshape public conception of religious liberty in the service
of faith groups. It is illuminating to look specifically to the interaction between the majority
opinion, which worked to separate claims to free exercise from claims to equality and liberty,
and the dissenting opinions which when taken together cast claims of LGBT equality as hostile
to religious free exercise. The opinions in Obergefell suggest that legal framing of LGBT rights
as in conflict with the rights of religious groups can be best understood as a tactic of socially and
politically hegemonic groups to co-opt the victimhood claims of marginalized populations.
In this essay, I will demonstrate through rhetorical analysis of the judicial opinions that a
combination of professionalist legal discourse9 and social culture creates a condition whereby
religious liberty can be rearticulated to recast a culturally dominant group, conservative
Christians, as a set upon class. This inversion is made possible by the dissent framing the
decision to grant marriage rights to LGBT individuals as altering the relationship between the
state and religious institutions. Prior to the decision, LGBT individuals had claimed victim status
by outlining the “emotional distress and stigma” wrought from bans on same sex marriage.10
Following the announcement, however, religious conservatives argued the decision constituted a
court led “siege on Christianity.”11 The rhetorical power of religious victimhood, in this context,
obfuscates the harm done to LGBT individuals within a heternormative, Judeo-Christian society
as a means to (re)articulate hegemonic status. As a rhetorical strategy, positioning oneself as a
victim may serve to shield one’s claim from skepticism, compel others to act, and ultimately
disrupt or re-entrench problematic structures. The analysis will show the capacity for legal
strategies assuming victimhood to invite forms of co-option from hegemonic groups, a cooptation rhetorically informed by the position of dissents vis a vis the majority opinion.
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The essay will proceed as follows. First, the legal and social context surrounding
religious liberty will be covered to highlight the ambiguity in the term, and the opportunity that
ambiguity offers for reconstituting victimhood. Second, the Supreme Court opinions will be
analyzed with religious liberty as an organizing term. Third, the rhetorical power of victimhood
will be discussed to critique the positioning of a culturally hegemonic group as a victim relative
to LGBT individuals. Finally, the implications of the inversion of victimhood through religious
liberty will be addressed.
Re-articulating religious liberty
Rhetorical scholars have long noted the way legal discourse function to sustain or disrupt
hegemonic social paradigms in the United States.12 The rhetorical power of law manifests from
the role courts play in signaling the (un)acceptability of legal standards because of the underlying
hierarchies those standards uphold. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court found the denial of
marriage rights to same sex couples problematic because of the disadvantages being unable to
wed placed on LGBT individuals. The plaintiff’s claims in Obergefell are set “against a long
history of disapproval of their relationships” where the states’ denial of marriage rights “works a
grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.”13 The
Court’s decisions are not simply legal dictates and jurisprudence; they are documents replete
with rhetorical power. As such, decisions can be used to achieve unique rhetorical ends, such as
the rearticulation of victimhood through religious liberty. The proceeding section will develop
the claim that religious freedom and interrelated concepts such as free exercise are inherently
ambiguous and ripe for strategic use.
Marouf Hasian Jr., Celeste Condit, and John Lucaites corroborate an understanding of
legal rhetoric that focuses on a negotiation of meaning. The authors suggest the law is “neither a
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rationally constructed discourse nor simply a dominant ideology, but rather an active and protean
component of a hegemonically crafted rhetorical culture.”14 Though the practice and discussion
of law features a distinct vocabulary, to think of the legal realm as a fundamentally different
sphere ignores the co-constitutive elements social and rhetorical cultures play in law.15 Legal
decisions often employ the language of an existing political culture, and in turn the rhetoric of
those decisions influences cultural standards.
Legal discourses are symbiotic with the broader culture in which they are uttered, with
decisions drawing from social standards all while constituting elements of the public debate.
Hasian and colleagues propose that the “law cannot exist apart from the public vocabulary of a
rhetorical culture.”16 That public vocabulary can serve to both constrain, and empower, the
boundaries of legal concepts. A cursory glance at the context of Obergefell supports the notion
that legal rhetoric would draw from meaningful social and religious discourses. Lisa Corrigan
documents the rise of Christian patriarchy in legal contexts, isolating both Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby and the Employee Non-Discrimination Act as flashpoints of a broader trend of religious
ideology “permeating public policy.”17 Peter Campbell supports this conclusion by suggesting
that the current landscape of religious liberty in the United States can be used both by, and
against, a “national heteropatriarchal agenda” in the context of rights for LGBT individuals.18 In
that agenda, one can locate religious liberty as an organizing term subject to contested meaning.
Despite the tendency for legal theory to seek “crystalline conceptual categories,”
concepts like religious liberty have varying and fluid meanings when transported between the
broader culture and the courtroom.19 In its historical context religious liberty refers to free
exercise of religion as guaranteed in the First Amendment to the Constitution: “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
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That constitutional guarantee has invited clarification, however, as religious and legal standards
in the United States have evolved over time. Roger Stahl argues “religious free exercise has
given the Supreme Court something to cut, something amorphous to carve into a recognizable
shape.”20 In this cutting, religious liberty is open to strategic redefinition that capitalizes on the
situated nature of the term. Despite a long legal history concerning free exercise, the term has
morphed over time as different schools of legal philosophy have developed. Different
philosophical distinctions, alongside existing jurisprudence, has created a circumstance where
what constitutes religious liberty is up for debate.
In this definitional ambiguity, rhetorical critics can locate transformations of meaning and
strategic capitalization. As Kenneth Burke notes, strategic employment of rhetoric is most clear
“not [in] terms that avoid ambiguity, but terms that clearly reveal the strategic spots at which
ambiguities necessarily arise (italics original).”21 As both a legal concept and political construct,
religious liberty is defined relationally and in opposition to other terms. Stephen Smith suggests:
[T]here is no single or self-subsisting “principle” of religious freedom; there is only a
host of individuals with a host of different opinions and notions about how much and
what kind of scope government ought to give to the exercise of religious beliefs and
practices. 22
This host of different opinions invites legal conflict between the state and individuals. Marc
DeGirolami argues that the history of religious liberty has featured debates over meaning,
application, and underlying government philosophy in the struggle to balance a constitutional
guarantee of religious liberty against government actions designed to further a societal good. In
this balancing act, the de facto expectation is that laws must be neutral in their influence on the
exercise of faith practices absent a compelling government interest in the curtailment of that
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practice. Douglas Laycock differentiates between two types neutrality: formal, and substantive.23
Formal neutrality, as expanded by Marci Hamilton, argues that a law should target no religion
specifically, and by extension no religion ought to be given exemptions to laws if that exemption
would generate significant social harm.24 Comparatively, substantive neutrality would manifest
as laws that when enforced do not significantly impact one practice of religious exercise over
another. In application, substantive neutrality more closely resembles the contemporary
framework established under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA); the government
must have a compelling justification to craft a law that would implicate religious practice.
Religious liberty has become exceedingly complicated as a consequence of groups
seeking exemptions to broadly applicable laws based on the free exercise clause. In its modern
incarnation, claims to religious liberty have primarily been the claims of individuals
experiencing undue harm. Following jurisprudence that privileged the claims of set upon
religious groups, the Supreme Court from the 1960s until the late 1980s codified broad legal
protection of the free exercise of religion. The 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith,
however, instigated changes to the way religious exemptions interact with existing laws.25
According to the logic of Employment Division, if a law is in place that is neutral and
generalizable in its application, the law may constitute a burden on the free exercise of religion if
the state has a rational basis for the adoption of the law. The decision put an end to decades of
gradual expansion for free exercise rights while inviting controversy and backlash on the
grounds that the decision would be used to curtail free exercise.
Following public and political fallout from Employment Division, the US Congress
passed with an overwhelming, bipartisan majority the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). The RFRA reestablished that strict scrutiny must be used in determining whether the
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Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment had been abridged and, though the law’s
constitutionality was challenged for its applicability to state law in City of Boerne v. Flores, the
strict scrutiny standards continue to apply to federal law. As such, a law interpreted to abridge
religious freedom is only constitutional if the law is necessary for the furtherance of a
compelling government interest, and must be the least restrictive way for the government to
support that interest.26 As determined in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, this interpretation of the
RFRA has created room to legally and rhetorically redefine “exercise.” With this societal context
in mind, Obergefell is the ideal vehicle for demonstrating the way religious liberty can be
mobilized to rearticulate claims of victimhood for American Christians who object to marriage
equality.
Re-articulation of victimhood for devout Christians is significant, as Christopher
Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager argue exemptions for broadly applicable laws should only exist
for groups “vulnerable to deep and undeserved disadvantage.”27 That disadvantage is not
apparent for the Christian faith in the United States. Christians constitute “a large majority of
Americans – roughly seven-in-ten” according to a 2015 survey by the Pew Research Council,28
and US society is awash with examples of “Christian cultural imperialism and Christian
hegemony.”29 Interestingly, Robert Jones and colleagues at the Brookings Institute found
politically and religiously conservative Christians perceive themselves to be the victims of
discrimination in disagreement with non-religious individuals, suggesting
[E]ight in ten (77%) white evangelical Protestants say that discrimination against
Christians now rivals that of other groups. Substantially fewer white mainline Protestants (54%), white Catholics (53%), black Protestants (53%), and Hispanic Catholics
(50%) agree that discrimination against Christians is now as big a problem as
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discrimination against other groups in the America. About eight in ten religiously
unaffiliated Americans (78%) and adherents of non-Christian religions (77%) disagree.30
In light of the advantages afforded to Christian individuals in the United States, it is curious to
see legal demands based on free exercise. As exemptions to broadly applicable laws are normally
given to those groups subject to undue hardship, seeking religious accommodation requires an
articulation of victimhood. In the context of Obergefell, one finds the rhetorical conditions for
the inversion of victimhood. Taken together, the dissenting opinions respond to the majority’s
casting of LGBT individuals as victims of undue harm to create a rhetorical circumstance
wherein victimhood is reversed. Rather than a group seeking governmental protection, LGBT
individuals are reinterpreted as aggressors against religious minorities.
LBGT rights and the unknown of religious liberty
Obergefell v. Hodges was decided in a cultural context where the treatment of LGBT
individuals by the government had become increasingly salient. Amongst both advocacy groups,
and a plurality of the public, LGBT individuals were increasingly viewed as disenfranchised
from the political process as a consequence of, among other things, lack of marriage equality.31
Justice Anthony Kennedy summarizes in the Majority opinion, “especially against a long history
of disapproval of their relationships, this denial [of marriage rights] works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians.”32 The broader cultural
narrative coupling lack of marriage equality with the hardships faced by LGBT individuals was
relatively commonplace. A comprehensive body of literature has discussed the harms
experienced by the LGBT community at the hands of individuals, religious groups, police, and
government policy.33 As such, LGBT individuals are understood first as foremost as victims of
harm from a government policy.
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Against this backdrop of LGBT victimhood, religious liberty is articulated as a related
but distinct issue. Kennedy suggests religious liberty is protected by a number of safeguards
untouched by Obergefell. Kennedy argues:
[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex
marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles
that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered.34
In light of the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause, the majority articulates the decision as
distinct from and only casually related to religious liberty.
The Supreme Court, according to Kennedy, is operating within the confines of the law
and actively seeking to respect individuals of faith. Prior to the section on religion, Kennedy
proposes “many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on
decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are
disparaged here.”35 The one aspect of the ruling uncovered, general disagreement with the
decision, is not legally implicated. Dissent is not read as an act that would be impossible
following Obergefell; Kennedy positions the majority as a respectful disagreement that lets alone
the question of free exercise.
This is not to read Kennedy’s opinion uncharitably, to accuse the majority of avoiding
tricky questions they do not want to answer. Kennedy’s implicit dismissal of the interaction
between religious liberty and equality is built in part on the assumption that LGBT individuals
were victims of undue harm as a consequence of unique targeting, what is legally called animus.
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Russell Robinson suggests that cases concerning LGBT rights have been decided differently
relative to racial and gender rights cases, with the invocation of animus as the notable difference.
Robinson demonstrates convincingly that LGBT rights cases have consistently been decided on a
review of animus, with Obergefell breaking “new ground in welcoming evidence of implicit bias
in sexual orientation cases, even as the Court has often ignored such evidence in race equal
protection cases.”36 Robinson suggests that Kennedy articulates Obergefell as the result of
government action that places undue burden on a specific group who’s liberty has been curtailed
for no reason other than animus. Peter Campbell corroborates this understanding of Kennedy’s
doctrinal commitments for LGBT rights, noting that Kennedy’s decision in Lawrence v Texas
emphasizes due process instead of equal protection, and thus casts LGBT individuals as subject
to undue harm from the state.37 Under the framework of animus as outlined by Robinson,
Obergefell is understood by the majority to be tangential to the free exercise clause, a case more
about compelling harm done to a minority than an instance of the government curtailing religious
exercise. By casting the primary justification for the decision in animus, substantive discussions
of equality and constitutional impact are rendered moot. Upon Kennedy’s discovery of harm to
LGBT individuals from governmental action, that action is de facto unconstitutional and
subsequently spurs judicial rebuke.
By invoking animus in so many words, Kennedy ensures that religious liberty is not the
central organizing term of the majority opinion. Though the constitutional impact of the decision
is obviously meaningful, organizing the majority around animus rejects the need for long-winded
explanations detailing the prudential impact of Obergefell on individuals of faith.38 Despite the
impact on religious liberty being downplayed, however, space existed for an alternative
interpretation that casts religious groups as victims. This space in partially opened as a
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consequence of invoking animus in the majority; by framing Obergefell as an undue burden on a
stigmatized population, the logic of the majority can be inverted through an articulation of a new
stigmatized population resultant from the decision. Where the majority opinion positions LGBT
individuals as oppressed, the minority opinion foregrounds the role of LGBT individuals, and by
extension the Supreme Court, in silencing dissent and victimizing devout religious followers.
The risk to religious liberty
Compared to the Majority opinion, religious liberty plays a larger role in some of the
dissenting opinions penned by Justice Samuel Alito, Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin
Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas. Each opinion, to varying degrees, explicitly highlights the
risk the court’s decision poses to religious liberty and the potential for creating a new group of
victims, thus inverting the animus based victimhood articulated in the majority. Discussions of
the risks posed to religious liberty follow three major themes; the creation of victims through the
stifling of dissent, the reconstitution of LGBT victimhood, and the removal of free exercise from
religious institutions.
Roberts positions the majority decision as a closure bordering on censure, a public
condemnation of the opposition that may stifle dissent. Roberts argues
there will be consequences to shutting down the political process on an issue of such
profound public significance. Closing debate tends to close minds. People denied a voice
are less likely to accept the ruling of a court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort
of thing courts usually decide.39
The notion of people “denied voices” stops short of articulating a new class of victim, but lays
the groundwork for the creation of slighted groups through “closed minds” and “closed debate.”
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Robert’s dissent establishes the risk of “closing debate” as a condition for a reversal of
victimhood.
In Robert’s discussion on the merits of the majority opinion, he casts the minority as a set
upon class, with oppressive gatekeepers shutting out civil discourse. Though perhaps not central
to his decision, Roberts articulates a minority class comparable to the subject position of LGBT
individuals. According to Roberts, actions taken by the state at the behest of LGBT groups create
disenfranchisement for some populations on matters of public importance. This notion, that the
majority decision crafts the conditions for groups to be shut out, serves as foundation for a
broader argument made by the dissents when taken together; the plaintiffs’ victory will come at a
cost to those who dissent. Where the majority framed LGBT individuals as generalized victims
of social and political animus, the dissents worked to expand the category of generalized victims
to include religious dissenters.
Justice Scalia echoes concerns about silence, indicating, “we must allow the debate to
continue” over same sex marriage.40 Scalia builds on the presuppositions of Robert’s dissent,
suggesting the public debate is a necessary expression by dissenters. It is not simply that the
debate is closed, however; the way the debate has been closed will be used nefariously against
those in opposition to it. Joining Scalia and Thomas, Justice Alito goes so far as to indicate the
majority opinion:
will be used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy. In the
course of its opinion, the majority compares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied
equal treatment for African-Americans and women. The implications of this analogy will
be exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dissent.41
In stifling debate, the court constitutes a new system wherein dissenters become victims,
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“vilified” and “stamped out” by executors of the new dogma. According to the logic of Alito’s
opinion, the patchwork of marriage laws in the United States were the necessary result of a
process that ensured religious liberty. By invoking Court action, that process had been disrupted
in a way catastrophic for dissenters.
Taken together, there is an attempt in the dissenting discussion of public opposition to
recast the plaintiffs not as victims, but as agitators. Rather than using the court as a metaphorical
shield to prevent laws from abridging rights, the plaintiffs are accused of demanding rights not
emanating from the constitution. Following the language used in United States v. Windsor, the 54 decision determining the unconstitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Roberts
argues LGBT individuals were attempting to “convert the shield provided by constitutional
liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the State.”42 This notion, that same
sex marriage is distinct from heterosexual marriage and, as such, the legal right to marriage
would be tantamount to a new “special right,” had been forwarded to varying degrees in the
dissenting opinions in Windsor and in Scalia’s dissent in Romer v. Evans, a notable 1996 case
concerning a Colorado law which would ban protections from employment discrimination for
LGBT individuals.43 This notion of a “special right” runs counter to the animus arguments
mobilized in Windsor; rather than understanding the repeal of DOMA, and the subsequent
decision in Obergfell, as the removal of limitations on the rights and freedoms of LGBT
individuals, those freedoms are articulated in the dissent as new special demands. By articulating
the rights upheld in the majority as “special rights,” Roberts recasts LGBT individuals as
agitators rather than a set upon minority, thus creating a condition for new forms of animus
against religious dissenters.
Following the logic that same sex marriage is a “special right,” Thomas engenders
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skepticism toward the claims of LGBT individuals. He suggests LGBT couples “have been able
to travel freely around the country, making their homes where they please. Far from being
incarcerated or physically restrained, petitioners have been left alone to order their lives as they
see fit.”44 Thomas envisions the plaintiffs not as individuals’ imposed on by bans on marriage,
but as rabble-rousers attempting to redefine even the most basic concept of dignity. Thomas
argues the fundamental disconnect of the majority opinion is a flawed conception of liberty that
assumes the state can afford dignity to individuals and that, in turn, the plaintiffs were making an
impossible demand. According to Thomas, “[o]ne’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was
something to be shielded from—not provided by—the State.”45 The use of the shield metaphor,
again, constructs the plaintiffs not as victims of harm, but as aggressors attempting to alter the
social order by demanding new rights from the state. By casting LGBT individuals as
victimizers, the minority opinion suggests a new hierarchy wherein the claims of religious
dissenters ought be privileged.
Following this articulation of power, the risk posed to religious liberty lies in the capacity
to exercise one’s faith. Roberts argues the decision “creates serious questions about religious
liberty. Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith, and their
freedom to exercise religion is –unlike the right imagined by the majority –actually spelled out in
the Constitution.”46 Roberts appeals to tradition and order, indicating “respect for sincere
religious conviction has led voters and legislators in every State that has adopted same-sex
marriage democratically to include accommodations for religious practice. The majority’s
decision imposing same-sex marriage cannot, of course, create such accommodations.” In light
of the stifled debate and ambiguity on how the majority opinion will impact free exercise,
Roberts suggests ominously “people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive
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from the majority today.” Note, however, the statement is as foreboding as it is vague; rather
than use concrete examples, Roberts merely shifts the respective players in the dramatic
interpretation of religious liberty. This shift is possible in part due to the mobilization of animus
in the majority opinion; by articulating LGBT individuals as general victims of government
animus in the majority, the dissent can then construct the specter of future victims as a reason to
reject the logic of Obergefell.
It is notable that, as the decision in Obergefell was not decided on the First Amendment,
substantive examination of the Free Exercise Clause and the enumeration of risks to religious
liberty may fall outside the scope of the dissent. Though a number of examples of conflict with
religious liberty were brought up in oral arguments, including Bob Jones University’s loss of tax
benefits following the 1967 legalization of interracial marriage, Roberts only offers a nod and a
prediction. Suggesting conflict will arise when “a religious college provides married student
housing only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place
children with same-sex married couples,” Roberts ultimately concludes “there is little doubt that
these and similar questions will soon be before this Court.” He stops short of arguing these
conflicts would indeed constitute an infringement on religious liberty, instead arguing the
majority has failed because where the opinion “graciously suggests that religious believers may
continue to ‘advocate’ and ‘teach’ their views of marriage, (…) the First Amendment guarantees,
however, the freedom to ‘exercise’ religion.”47 With the articulation of LGBT individuals as
victims of animus in the majority, however, an opportunity arises to create a new set of victims
in the dissents. To wit, Thomas claims those who were once victims at the hands of the state
have became a newly empowered class of oppressors who would turn their gaze towards the
devout. Thomas predicts a future clash between religious liberty and LGBT rights, as “it appears
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all but inevitable that the two will come into conflict, particularly as individuals and churches are
confronted with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex
couples.”48 When taken together, the dissenting opinions invert victimhood to cast the devout as
set upon by LGBT individuals. That inversion is made possible through ambiguity in what
constitutes religious liberty, with each dissent capitalizing on the indeterminate nature of the
term and the majority’s emphasis on LGBT victimhood.
To what end, victimhood?
In Obergefell, a rhetorical situation is created wherein power lies with the victim of
hardship. By presenting religious dissenters as a class set upon by LGBT agitators, the public
debate is cast by the dissents in the shadow of the victim. Pascal Bruckner argues Western
cultures have developed an unhealthy relationship with guilt that promotes self flagellation as
progress. Remorse, according to Bruckner, is not bad in its totality; quoting Jean Marc Ferry, the
author indicates that “we have to remember, in a critical way, the violence and humiliation we
have inflicted on whole peoples on every continent in order to impose our vision of humanity
and civilization.”49 It is possible, however, that remembrance may provide a false cue.
Bruckner suggests many Western cultures have developed a new epistemology that
promotes to heroic status the victims of oppression. This “pathology of guilt” arises from
atrocities visited upon the rest of the world at the hands of religious zealots, imperial powers, and
totalitarian governments.50 To be sure, the tendency to privilege the victim is, in most instances,
a welcome reversal that serves to destabilize hegemonic forces and empower healing. Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, for example, offered an opportunity for South Africans to
discursively expunge the sins of apartheid by bringing both victim and oppressor together to air
grievances.51 Ultimately, however, it is possible for an epistemology that privileges victimhood
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to promote new and destructive power relations. In the mantle of victimhood, one establishes an
unassailable moral position. Bruckner argues:
Anyone who seizes control of [victimhood] also seizes power. The great superiority of
unhappiness over happiness is that it provides a destiny. It alone distinguishes us,
enthrones us in a new aristocracy of the outcast. An unprecedented mental register: one
has to display one’s own distress and if possible eclipse that of one’s neighbors in order
to be recognized as the most meritorious.52
This discussion of victimhood as hegemony is not to suggest that there is not a reality of
oppression in the international sphere. To argue victims do not exist, or that the claims of the
oppressed should be viewed with skepticism, would serve to inscribe a dangerous cynicism onto
evaluating hierarchies of power. Instead, understanding victimhood is rhetorically constructed
can empower scholars to ask questions about claims advanced in the public sphere. The
preceding analysis of victimhood claims in Obergfell demonstrates a refinement of Bruckner’s
perspective that would interrogate the rhetorical use and function of victimhood in the context of
legal and social struggles for power. Justin Crumbaugh suggests, rather than inviting criticism of
victims, asking question such as “what is victimhood being invoked to accomplish, and what
subjects, objects, and rationalities are produced through such invocations” can ultimately reveal
and destabilize problematic power structures.53 In instances where dominant forces cast
themselves as victims relative to the state or historically marginalized populations, critics ought
be equipped to discuss the rhetorical work done by victimhood claims.
Complicating critical introspection, however, is the tendency to arbitrate what constitutes
a victim. Crumbaugh argues the ontology of victimhood has been mapped onto the political
sphere, empowering actors to rhetorically construct victims and, in doing so, “produces both
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‘false’ victims and ‘true’ victims.”54 He isolates conservative discussions of reverse racism and
liberal victimhood typified in texts such as Ann Coulter’s Guilty: Liberal "Victims" and Their
Assault on America as a strategic discursive attempt “whereby its proponents seek to disqualify
their opponents by rhetorically constructing a strawman [sic] target of progressives playing the
victim, while at the same forging a new symbolic terrain in which they themselves are the only
truly authentic victims.”55 A discursive shift can occur, moving conversations away from the
structural harms enacted upon individuals, and towards an argument over who or what
constitutes a victim.56 This rhetorical competition manifests as groups vying for “victim” status,
often obfuscating structures that led to conflict in the first place.
This question of victimhood invites discussion of the dimensions of religious and
political power in the United States. Rhetorical work like the present study of religious
victimhood breaks from the victim/victimizer dichotomy so deftly employed by rightist groups
and hegemonic forces by presenting a third option that illuminates the stakes in the rhetorical
negotiation of victimhood toward the end of clarifying, and perhaps even destabilizing, the
relationship between hegemony and marginality vis a vis victimhood. In the final section of the
paper, I will note the specific implications of this type of analysis by highlighting its
contemporaneous use and the relationship victimhood discourse has to policy adoption.
Victimhood and Skepticism: Discussion and Implications
The preceding analysis has sought to complicate victimhood claims by interrogating
underlying historical, political, and social factors, including the invocation of animus and the role
judicial dissents play in the creation of rhetorical possibility. This interrogation presents an
alternative to the binary victim-oppressor relationship and the rhetorical power that relationship
entails. By tracing lines of force that contribute to, and radiate from, victimhood claims, one may

21
understand unspoken motives and power relations that would otherwise go unchallenged. Rather
than outright rejection or acceptance of victim status of religious dissenters, the present study
offers a third option: interrogate those claims in relation to broader power structures and political
configurations to determine what, if anything, is to come from the argumentative position of
victim. The analysis of the dissenting opinions invites an understanding of claims to religious
liberty as the claims of victims, as dissents have the capacity to signal the acceptability of
particular strains of argument.57
It is worth noting, then, that the cultural backdrop of Obergfell is not characterized by
widespread oppression of religious liberty, or Christianity writ large. American Christianity does
not, as a homogenous entity, face what many would consider hardship. Though individual sects
may face criticism or skepticism when brought into national conversations, Christianity is
afforded a large degree of cultural power, acting, as Walter Blumenfeld argues, to actualize
“Christian privilege” through policies and social goals that either overtly or inadvertently
promote Christianity.58 Indeed, with approximately 70% of Americans identifying as
“Christian,” a narrative that proposes the widespread persecution of individuals of faith does not
appear coherent.59 To position devout Christians as victims of state oppression would require
moving beyond appeals to empirical data. By employing religious liberty, rhetors use ambiguity
in legal discourse to recast themselves as underdogs against the state, a position consistent with
identity politics and political movements.60 To be a victim means ones’ position is tenuous,
conditional, and fraught with hardship, compared to position of the oppressor. The adoption of
Christian victimhood could serve, then, to undo the meaningful social gains of LGBT individuals
in the name of preserving the rights of religious liberty.
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This is not to say that individuals of faith, Christian or otherwise, do not face suffering
and hardship. There are concrete threats to religious liberty in the every day; Christians have
been victim to execution in the Middle East, Muslim individuals are actively targeted based on
misconceptions of their faith, and non-religious individuals are viewed with extreme skepticism
in American society.61 Of specific note are those business owners who have experienced
turbulence as a consequence of shifting public opinion on same sex marriage, including most
notably the plaintiff in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. At the
center of the case is the hotly contested legal question as to the extent the government can
compel private businesses to engage in behavior they find to violate their religious beliefs. As
determined in Burwell, engaging in a commercial enterprise does not strip a business owner, or
its employees, of their rights to free exercise.62 In Masterpiece, cake shop owner Jack Phillips
contends that a Colorado law precluding him from denying service to a gay couple constitutes a
violation of his deeply held personal and religious beliefs.63
Phillip’s case is built, in part, on the rhetorical assumption present in the preceding
analysis; victimhood, through the lens of religious belief, is used to invert a social dynamic to
justify retrenchment of anti-gay behavior in the public sphere. Though the plaintiffs articulate
Masterpiece as a limited attempt to create “breathing room” for small business owners, select
legal precedents and dissents may portent the possibility of expansive exemptions justified under
religious victimhood. For example, Scalia’s dissent in Romer suggests the creation of special
rights for LGBT individuals that were necessarily opposed to the dominant culture of the time.
That opposition, according to Scalia, was problematic as the court’s ruling victimized the
majority who held beliefs condemning homosexuality. Indeed, Scalia notes “the Court's opinion
contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of ‘animus’ or ‘animosity’

23
toward homosexuality, as though that has been established as UnAmerican.”64 The articulation of
victimhood for the majority, empowered through the rhetorical positioning of dissents like
Scalia’s in Romer, Alito’s in Windsor, and the Justices in Obergefell, are part of a broader
rhetorical landscape that has roots in rejecting legal attempts to dismantle social hierarchies
enshrining racial and gender discrimination.
In Masterpiece, victimhood claims are comparable to those circulated against laws
mandating racial integration and ensuring interracial marriage in the 1960s, claims that
positioned culturally hegemonic forces as set upon by minority interests. Michael Curtis
highlights the similarities between religious criticisms of marriage equality and religious
objections to integration to conclude that to grant religious exemptions to broadly applicable
laws concerning gay individuals would necessitate those same exemptions to laws concerning
racial and gender parity.65 Victimhood, here, naturalizes religious claims to the necessary
detriment of marginalized populations still subject to significant material and symbolic harm in
the status quo. This strategy of downplaying the marginalized in favor of majoritarian goals is
visible in other instances, as well; Eric King Watts notes that discourses of postraciality
obfuscate the material harm to black bodies and are often paired with narratives of white
victimization to construct fantasies of violence, and returns to white supremacy.66 Paul Johnson
corroborates the power of victimization fantasies in his analysis of toxic masculinity during
Donald Trump’s campaign for the presidency.67 The present study joins the growing body of
research concerning the rhetorical power of victimhood to reverse material gains of marginalized
populations and retrench hegemonic powers, as the rhetorical study of victimhood offers
resources for rethinking victimhood claims in the public sphere.

24
The rhetorical study of victimhood is particularly meaningful for two reasons. First, as
they are discussed here, rhetorics of victimhood may serve to create a false equivalency that
ought be recognized. A burgeoning body of legal scholarship has looked to the unique problem
victimhood, and by extension reviews of animus, can pose to social movements seeking rights
and recognition for marginalized populations.68 Where previously legal gains predicated on equal
protection proved viable, the gradual removal of overt racial and gender characterizations from
law and regulations have complicated the capacity for groups to demonstrate discrimination,
even if a policy disproportionately effects a racial or gender minority. The perverse impact of the
success of animus reviews in the context of racial and gender discrimination cases has led to the
challenging of laws designed to promote social good through the explicit benefitting of a
marginalized population, such as race conscious admission standards for colleges. Robinson
notes that claims of discrimination towards socially powerful groups, such as white students in
Fisher v. Texas, have routinely surfaced and appear to have an amount of traction based in the
contention that by excluding, both textually and materially, socially powerful groups from the
benefit of those policies constitutes a form of animus. The articulation of religious groups as
generalized victims preceding Burwell and following Obergefell can best be understood as a
rightist co-optation of victimhood claims that responds to a legal culture that uniquely privileges
the claims of a specific kind of victim.
The legal complexities of animus, and the danger of false equivalencies, are simplified
and magnified in individuals who use the logic of the dissents for political gain. Indeed,
conservative politicians were quick to rally against the ruling by wrapping themselves in the
cloth of victimhood. Sen. Mike Lee, (R-UT) introduced the First Amendment Defense Act on
June 3rd to pre-empt a possible Supreme Court ruling, stating “we need to draw lines around the
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power of government, lines that are there to protect the people from the overpowering influence
of government — an overpowering influence that can, from time to time, trample on religious
freedom.”69 Immediately following the ruling, Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) indicated, “the IRS will
start going after Christian schools, Christian universities, Christian charities and any institutions
that follow a biblical teaching of marriage."70 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) contended following the
ruling that “we are at the water's edge of the argument that mainstream Christian teaching is hate
speech. Because today we've reached the point in our society where if you do not support samesex marriage, you are labeled a homophobe.”71 The notion that dissent met with harsh criticism
constitutes victimhood echoes the minority opinion’s casting of closed minds as problematic. As
a consequence of the ambiguity of religious liberty in the dissenting opinions, such conceptual
slippage was not only possible but strategic. Brucker argues victim status creates a form of
unassailability where the audience accepts the initial premise of victimhood, and is expected to
then consent to every subsequent premise regarding what constitutes oppression, viable courses
of action, and calls for retribution.72 In the context of uncivil discourse, adopting the mantle of
victim is a way to short circuit claims that critiqued heteronormativity (such as “homophobe”),
and those claims that baldly equated calls for religious liberty with state sanctioned
discrimination.
The second reason the rhetorical study of victimhood is so crucial is that the risks
highlighted in Obergefell do not stop at the possibility of policy rollback or increasingly salient
group divisions. Perhaps most the most perverse impact is that hegemonic adoption of
victimhood invites the re-inscription of power structures that delegitimize the experiences of
victims. A danger of critical victim studies is the tendency to position the scholar, and by
extension the pundit, lawyer, or politician, as an arbiter of victim claims. Bruckner indicates that
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by emphasizing victim’s rights, Western societies have “combine[d] romanticism with suffering;
we form a new elite caste, with an absolute allergy to pain, the ideal being acquire the title of
pariah without having enduring anything.”73 Competition ensues wherein individuals attempt to
construct themselves as the most oppressed relative to other groups. Even worse, the privileging
of victimhood may paradoxically demote the status of those who have atrocities visited upon
them. Bruckner argues that “what people want to strip from the victim in order to clothe
themselves in it is the moral eminence, the tragic splendor it seems to enjoy.”74 Rightly,
individual experiences related to suffering are rarely met with skepticism. To meet a rape
victim’s claims by questioning the coherence of their story is a mechanism to re-inscribe a
cultural hegemony to erase violence enacted against minority groups. In light of culturally
powerful forces co-opting victimhood, however, a cynicism may arise that encourages
individuals to be skeptical of victim claims, otherwise the victim could be “crying wolf” or
“cashing in” on individual tragedy.
The present study, and preceding anecdotes, demonstrates the potential power victimhood
has to effect change within the political sphere, and the possibility of co-optation when
victimhood becomes the de facto framework through which we evaluate legal impacts. By
arguing institutional changes that alter the state’s relationship to some religious institutions
constitute oppression, victimhood for the majority is achieved. Obviously, if a hegemonic force
is able to co-opt a traditionally counterhegemonic tactic, the capacity to challenge systemic
oppression is diminished. Emily Bazelon argues, “unlike in earlier eras, when religious
objections let the faithful separate themselves from institutions they felt they could not support,
many conservatives now deploy the phrase as a way of excluding other people.”75 Such a tactic
is especially meaningful in light of the rapid changes in both public opinion and law on LGBT
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rights. Discourses that entrench group victimhood as legal strategy can serve to further divide,
polarize, and otherwise harm an electorate already politically cleaved along various lines.76
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges was heralded as a great
leap forward in the move to promote equality under the law for LGBT individuals. The
dissenting opinions tempered this victory, however, by rearticulating religious liberty to afford
victimhood to a hegemonic religious force. Ultimately, this re-articulation makes clear the stakes
of the social and legal arrangement of the status quo and invites new questions regarding the
rhetorical nature of victimhood and how legal movements can be mobilized to both combat
social inequality, and attempt to reinforce them.
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